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APPLE V. PEPPER: RATIONALIZING ANTITRUST’S 
INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Supreme Court held that consumers who 
allegedly paid too much for apps sold on Apple’s App Store because of 
an antitrust violation could sue Apple for damages because they were “di-
rect purchasers.”1 The decision sidesteps most of the bizarre complexities 
that have resulted from the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Illinois Brick 
Co. v. Illinois, which held that indirect purchasers could not sue for passed- 
on overcharge injuries under federal antitrust laws.2 
I. THE INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE UNDER ILLINOIS BRICK 
The Illinois Brick decision itself was factually straightforward, al-
though its reasoning was controversial. Makers of construction blocks 
fixed their prices and sold them to contractors who built buildings for 
the State of Illinois.3 No one seriously doubted that when a cartel sells some-
thing at a higher price to an intermediary, that intermediary firm will pass 
on at least part of the price increase to its own customers, and so on 
down the line. The legal question was how the antitrust laws should rec-
ognize that fact in determining the right to collect damages.4 
Purchaser damages in cartel and monopolization cases are ordinarily 
measured by the amount of the price increase, or “overcharge.” Roughly 
                                                                                                                           
 *  James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and 
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. This Piece expands and supports a 
suggestion made in Herbert Hovenkamp, Fixing Antitrust’s Indirect Purchaser Rule, Reg. 
Rev. (July 17, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/17/hovenkamp-fixing-antitrust- 
indirect-purchaser-rule/ [https://perma.cc/7984-LBHN]. 
 1. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977)). 
 2. 431 U.S. at 746–47. The decision was a logical complement to the Court’s 
previous decision in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488 & n.6 
(1968), which held that a defendant could not have its damages reduced by the amount 
that the plaintiff passed on to its own customers. The Illinois Brick decision and its complex 
aftermath are analyzed in 2A Phillip E. Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp, Rodger D. Blair & 
Christine Piette Durrance, Antitrust Law ¶ 346 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter 2A Areeda et 
al., Antitrust Law]. 
 3. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 726. 
 4. Id. 
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speaking, this is the difference between the actual price that the 
defendant(s) charged and the price that would have prevailed had there 
not been any price fixing. As Justice Holmes put it in the first Supreme 
Court decision to confront the issue, the measure of damages should be 
“the difference between the price paid and the market or fair price that 
the city would have had to pay under natural conditions had the combi-
nation been out of the way, together with an attorney’s fee.”5 
Illinois Brick held that the first purchaser in line, or the direct 
purchaser, should obtain the entire overcharge as damages, without any 
reduction for the amount that it had passed on to purchasers beneath it 
in the distribution chain.6 Accordingly, indirect purchasers would not be 
able to claim any damages, since they had already been recovered in full 
by the direct purchaser.7 This rule, the Court noted, was not one of 
“standing” but rather of entitlement to damages.8 
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court recognized some qualifications, 
indicating that its concern was with the computation of passed-on dam-
ages rather than standing to sue.9 For example, purchasers under a pre-
existing contract that fixed both the quantity and markup could obtain 
damages, for in such cases the entire overcharge would be passed on.10 
Other exceptions were not mentioned by the Supreme Court but flowed 
naturally from the Court’s focus on passed-on damages. For example, the 
lower courts have held that Illinois Brick does not preclude an action for 
an injunction because no calculation of passed-on damages is necessary.11 
In its noneconomic approach based on proximate cause, the Apple 
                                                                                                                           
 5. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906). 
On the measurement of overcharge damages in cartel cases, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (6th ed. forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript § 17.5) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy]. 
 6. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 745–46. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 728 n.7. Specifically, the Court stated: 
Because we find Hanover Shoe dispositive here, we do not address the 
standing issue, except to note, as did the Court of Appeals below, that 
the question of which persons have been injured by an illegal 
overcharge for purposes of § 4 [of the Clayton Act] is analytically distinct 
from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote 
to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 9. See id. at 737. 
 10. See id. at 736; see also Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 393 U.S. 481, 
494 (1968) (recognizing the same exception); 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note 
2, ¶ 346e (discussing the exception for preexisting fixed-cost, fixed-quantity contracts). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 402 (3d Cir. 2000); 
see also 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note 2, ¶ 346d. 
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dissenters doubted standing for indirect purchasers seeking only an 
injunction.12 
The Supreme Court also held in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc. that 
the indirect purchaser rule applied even when the direct purchaser pass-
ed on 100% of its overcharge.13 The direct purchaser in that case was a 
price-regulated utility that operated under a state statute that computed 
rates as including a one-to-one pass-through of all variable costs, which 
included fuel costs.14 Indeed, as the dissenters pointed out, the state 
regulatory provision required complete pass-through of the overcharge, 
which appeared as a surcharge on each customer’s utility bill.15 Neverthe-
less, the Court concluded the utility itself was the direct purchaser and 
the customers, who paid the entire overcharge, were merely indirect pur-
chasers.16 In that case, the direct purchasing utility was not injured by the 
cartel. By statute, it passed on 100% of its overcharge.17 Further, it suf-
fered little or no decline in output.18 The Supreme Court effectively gave 
the only antitrust cause of action to a firm that had not been injured. 
About half of the states have either amended or interpreted their 
own antitrust statutes so as to permit indirect purchaser damages actions, 
and the Supreme Court has approved such provisions.19 Most of the 
litigation progress we have made in determining how antitrust damages 
                                                                                                                           
 12. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525–27, 1527 n.1 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting); see also infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 13. 497 U.S. 199, 203–05 (1990); see also Simon v. KeySpan Corp., 694 F.3d 196, 198 
(2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1998 (2013) (mem.) (holding that a retail electric 
consumer complaining of price fixing in the wholesale electricity market was an indirect 
purchaser). 
 14. See UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 205. Under cost-of-service ratemaking, a public utility 
generally recovers a fair rate of return on its fixed costs plus “pass-through” of variable 
costs. See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 36–59 (1982); 1 Alfred E. Kahn, The 
Economics of Regulation 26–57 (1971). 
 15. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 222–23 (White, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. at 207 (majority opinion) (finding that “the consumers in this case have the 
status of indirect purchasers” and therefore “any antitrust claim against the defendants is 
not for them, but for the utilities to assert”). The Utilicorp decision rejected a carefully 
reasoned opinion by Judge Richard Posner in a related case, who observed not only that 
there was perfect 100% pass-through, but also that there was very little output reduction 
resulting from the price fix because the retail elasticity of demand for power was very low. 
See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 895–97 (7th Cir. 
1988); cf. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 609 F.2d 497, 499 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1979) (holding that “any functional equivalent of a cost-plus contract exception to the 
Hanover Shoe ban against defensive use of passing on must be one that is already in 
existence, in that its impact on pricing decisions must be known in advance”). 
 17. See UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 205. 
 18. Cf. Hartigan, 852 F.2d at 896 (noting, in an analogous rate regulated 
environment, that “an increase in . . . rates was bound to increase the firm’s revenues”). 
 19. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989). For a comprehensive 
survey of state law indirect purchaser provisions, see 14 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2412d (4th ed. 2019 & Supp. 2019). 
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are passed through a distribution chain has undoubtedly occurred in the 
context of this state antitrust litigation. 
II. COMPLEXITIES AND AMBIGUITIES IN THE DISTRIBUTION CHAIN 
The facts of Apple v. Pepper were more complex than those of Illinois 
Brick, and illustrate some of the difficulties that the courts have faced in 
applying the indirect purchaser rule. The owners of Apple’s iPhones are 
required to purchase programs, or “apps,” on Apple’s App Store, which 
is itself an app that can be found on the iPhone screen.20 Apple’s App 
Store is thus a bottleneck through which the apps’ producers must pass if 
they are to reach Apple iPhone users. In this consumer class action, 
iPhone owners accused Apple of monopolizing the market for Apple 
iPhone app sales, both through this exclusivity requirement and by 
charging app producers a very high commission of 30% of the app’s sale 
price.21 The plaintiffs alleged the margin was extremely high in relation 
to cost because Apple does very little in its role of distributor of these 
apps sold by others.22 
In this case, unlike Illinois Brick, the customers paid their money and 
purchased directly from Apple. “There is no intermediary in the distribu-
tion chain between Apple and the consumer.”23 The Supreme Court ma-
jority found this to be “dispositive” of the result—namely, that the 
plaintiffs paid their money directly to the defendants, and this entitled 
them to be treated as direct purchasers.24 
This would all seem clear enough were it not for the fact that in the 
forty-year history of Illinois Brick jurisprudence other courts had charac-
terized this same problem differently. A case in point is Campos v. 
Ticketmaster,25 which was very similar to Apple, although neither the 
district court nor either of the Supreme Court opinions in Apple dis-
cussed it. The Ninth Circuit decision, however, addressed it at some 
length.26 In Ticketmaster, the defendant, Ticketmaster, was an online event 
                                                                                                                           
 20. Brief for Respondents at 4, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17-
204), 2018 WL 4659225. 
 21. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1518–19. 
 22. See Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 40–41, In re 
Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., No. 11-cv-06714-YGR, 2013 WL 6253147 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 
2013), 2013 WL 6387366. 
 23. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 26. For the Ninth Circuit’s discussion, see In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 
F.3d 313, 323 (9th Cir. 2017). For other decisions raising similar issues to Apple, see In re 
ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. 
Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 257 (2013) (mem.) (holding that ATM card users 
were indirect purchasers, notwithstanding that ATM machine operators, who allegedly 
fixed transaction fee prices, charged these to banks, who passed them on 100% to the card 
users); McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., 80 F.3d 842, 848–55 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 
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ticket retailer accused of monopolizing event ticket sales.27 The purchas-
ers were event goers who bought their tickets directly from Ticketmaster, 
paying high processing and handling fees.28 Ticketmaster itself set the 
final ticket price.29 The court held, however, that the concert promoters 
were direct purchasers of “ticket distribution services” from Ticketmas-
ter,30 and that the actual ticket buyers were only indirect purchasers of 
these services.31 This was true, the court reasoned, because there was “an 
antecedent transaction between the monopolist and another, independ-
ent purchaser” who was in a position to absorb part or all of the over-
charge.32 Under the plaintiff’s theory of the case, the concert promoters 
presumedly behaved as most intermediaries behaved: They passed on 
Ticketmaster’s high markups by charging higher wholesale prices for the 
tickets. The final purchasers, who actually used the tickets, were the only 
ones unable to pass anything on. 
Ticketmaster produces the perverse result that the buyer who is able 
to pass on all or part of the overcharge is treated as the direct purchaser 
and can sue for damages, while the buyer who is at the end of the line 
and must absorb the entire overcharge passed on to it has no damages 
claim, even though it purchased directly from the defendant. As in Apple, 
the Ticketmaster consumers paid the violator directly, but the Eighth 
Circuit found them to be “indirect” purchasers. The Apple decision 
effectively overruled Ticketmaster sub silentio. The Apple majority created 
an apparently categorical rule that whoever pays the money directly to 
the defendant should be counted as the direct purchaser.33 
III. THE PROBLEM OF PASSED-ON DAMAGES 
Illinois Brick’s indirect purchaser rule was problematic from the 
beginning for a number of reasons that the Apple majority did not 
address and certainly did not fix. First, it was plainly inconsistent with the 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. 825 (1996) (mem.) (holding that lawyers who purchased copies of hospital records 
on behalf of clients were the direct purchasers, even though they passed on the entire 
price to the clients, who were the plaintiffs); Hyland v. Homeservices of Am., Inc., No. 
3:05-cv-612-R, 2006 WL 3498569, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2006) (finding that Illinois Brick 
barred a challenge to real estate broker commission fixing brought by home buyers); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 44, app. A at 5a–6a, Durkin v. Major League Baseball, 519 
U.S. 825 (1996) (No. 95-208) (including the Third Circuit opinion, which held that cable 
television subscribers were indirect purchasers with respect to their claim of price-fixing 
among sports teams, cable channels, and cable programmers when these prices were 
charged to local cable television companies and then passed on to subscribers). 
 27. Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d at 1168. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 1169, 1171–72. 
 30. Id. at 1171. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1169. 
 33. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
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antitrust damages statute, which gives an action to “any person who shall 
be injured in his business or property” by an antitrust violation.34 That 
hardly sounds like a limitation to direct purchasers. 
A. Computing Pass-on 
Second, the Illinois Brick Court exaggerated the difficulty of 
“tracing” indirect purchaser damages. Computing how damages are 
passed on at each stage of a distribution chain requires “incidence” anal-
ysis, which economists use to compute how a tax or other expenditure is 
passed along through the economy. In general, the more elastic a firm’s 
demand, the more of an overcharge it will shift to others. By contrast, the 
more inelastic its demand the more it will have to absorb.35 Indeed, the 
earliest explicit Supreme Court applications of economic analysis to a 
legal problem occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, and involved computa-
tion of how a tax might be passed on from one entity to another.36 While 
the Illinois Brick decision acknowledged its relevance,37 later decisions 
held that the effect of Illinois Brick was to forbid the use of incidence anal-
ysis in the estimation of passed-on antitrust damages.38 
                                                                                                                           
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) reads: 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any 
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant 
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in 
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . . 
 35. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have 
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois 
Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602, 615–21 (1979). For a critique, see Robert Cooter, Passing on 
the Monopoly Overcharge: A Further Comment on Economic Theory, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1523 (1981). 
 36. E.g., Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 581–82 & n.1 (1931) 
(Stone, J., dissenting) (applying economic analysis to the incidence of a sales tax). The 
economist who contributed nearly all of the citations in these cases was Edwin R.A. 
Seligman. See generally Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation 
(5th ed., rev. ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1926) (1899); Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Taxation 
of Corporations. III., 5 Pol. Sci. Q. 636, 671–75 (1890); Edwin R.A. Seligman, The General 
Property Tax, 5 Pol. Sci. Q. 24 (1890); Edwin R.A. Seligman, On the Shifting and 
Incidence of Taxation, 7 Publications Am. Econ. Ass’n 7, 119 (1892). On the use of early 
marginalist economics to deal with problems of tax incidence, as well as the courts’ 
numerous citations to Seligman, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law: 
Neoclassical Legal Thought, 1870–1970, at 106–22, 367 n.59 (2015) [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law]. 
 37. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741 n.25 (1977). 
 38. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that Illinois Brick bars the use of incidence analysis in the 
computation of passed-on damages); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 
n.19, 1166 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting the Illinois Brick Court’s disapproval of the “speculative 
nature” of incidence analysis); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Commentary, The Indirect-
Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1717, 1721 (1990) (“[T]he Illinois 
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To illustrate the problem, if a farmer is taxed on wheat, she may 
absorb part of that tax but pass a portion on to the wholesale bread 
baker, who may in turn pass some of it on to the grocer, who will then 
pass part of it on to the consumer. The technical quantification of pass-
on is quite demanding, requiring determination of the elasticities of 
supply and demand facing each individual firm in the distribution 
chain.39 A further complication is that the calculations are very sensitive 
to the distribution of fixed and variable costs. Variable costs generally 
show up in the market price and are passed on; fixed costs generally are 
not.40 
However, in most cases antitrust experts can assess damages without 
computing pass-on.41 For example, under the “before-and-after” method, 
the expert looks at a market just prior to the violation, just subsequent, 
or both, comparing prices during the violation and nonviolation peri-
ods.42 The “yardstick” method of estimating damages compares prices in 
the violation market with those in a similar “yardstick” market where the 
violation is thought not to be occurring.43 In both cases, one does not 
need to estimate pass-on at each stage. Rather, the expert compares the 
price in the cartel market with the price in some reasonably similar com-
parator market that was not affected by the cartel.44 
For example, suppose that dairies are fixing prices, raising the 
wholesale price of milk from $2.00 to $3.00 per gallon. The milk is sold 
to distributors, who sell it to grocers, who finally sell it to consumers. 
Computing the amount passed on by each of these would be difficult. 
But suppose we can identify a “yardstick” market, similar to the cartel 
market but without price fixing. In that market the dairies’ wholesale 
price is $2.00, as it should be. Ignoring the distributors and grocers, who 
are not parties, we also observe that retail prices in this competitive mar-
ket are $2.90, while retail prices in the cartel market are $3.75. If consum-
ers sue, we do not need to know how much of the overcharge was passed 
on at each level. These numbers tell us that although not all of the over-
charge was passed on, consumers in the cartel market paid 85 cents more 
                                                                                                                           
Brick exception for pre-existing, fixed-markup, fixed-quantity contracts should be 
broadened to cover all ‘cost-plus’ contracts.”); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Incidence Analysis 
and the Supreme Court: Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. 
Rev. 69, 72–84 (1982) (explaining the basic principles of incidence analysis). 
 39. See Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 620. 
 40. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 35, at 1523–24. 
 41. See 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note 2, ¶ 346k. 
 42. See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, supra note 5, § 17.5b2. 
 43. Id. § 17.5b1. Illustrating the methodology is Greenhaw v. Lubbock Cty. Beverage 
Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1026 (5th Cir. 1983). In Greenhaw, the court stated, “By comparing 
these ‘should have been’ prices to the actual prices charged in 1975, [the expert] was able 
to estimate the amount of overcharge resulting from defendants’ price-fixing activity.” Id. 
 44. See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, supra note 5, § 17.5. 
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for their milk. This represents their overcharge, regardless of how much 
was absorbed at each link along the way.45 
Courts have approved these incidence-avoiding methodologies in 
cases involving state antitrust laws that permit indirect purchaser recov-
eries.46 As one court observed, “the before-and-after ‘yardstick’ 
methodology has been accepted by courts as a means to measuring 
damages in both indirect and direct purchaser antitrust actions.”47 One 
district court noted and approved the plaintiff expert’s use in what it 
characterized as: 
[A] “bottom across” approach which obviates the complexities 
Defendants cite in their “top down” approach. “Bottom across” 
means that the overcharge is determined by examining the 
price differential between the generic and the brand drug at 
the retail level only. Thus, there will be no need to review “pass-
through” variations.48 
                                                                                                                           
 45. Id. § 17.5b1. For a situation where computation of pass-on was not required, see 
Drug Mart Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 93-CV-5148 (ILG), 2002 WL 
31528625, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002). The plaintiff pharmacies were indirect 
purchasers of pharmaceuticals complaining under state antitrust law that a charge-back 
system effectively required them to pay more for pharmaceuticals than did favored 
purchasers, such as HMOs. The plaintiffs’ claimed injury was mainly loss in their ability to 
compete with the favored purchasers. Id. at *1–3. In this case, overcharge damages could 
be computed by comparing the net price paid by the pharmacies with that paid by other 
purchasers at the same distribution level; in any event, diversion of sales rather than the 
overcharge better captures the plaintiffs’ injuries. 
 46. E.g., In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 284 F.R.D. 207, 232–33 (E.D. Pa. 2012) 
(approving the methodology); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 
672, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (same); see also In re Class 8 Transmission Indirect Purchaser 
Antitrust Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 339, 349–54 (D. Del. 2015) (evaluating incidence-avoiding 
methodologies, but finding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden), vacated on other 
grounds, 679 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2017); cf. Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-99-709, 
CV-99-752, 2001 WL 1012261, at *16 (Me. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2001) (expressing doubt 
about the methodology when the defendant sold at a wide variety of prices). 
 47. In re Flonase, 284 F.R.D. at 232. For an expression of skepticism, see Thomas A. 
Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust’s Business Model, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 187 (2006) (reviewing 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (2005)) (arguing 
that the indirect purchaser rule “provides a closer to optimal level of deterrence” than 
incidence-avoiding methodologies). 
 48. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 326, 344 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see 
also In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., No. 15-12730-DJC, 2017 WL 53695, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 
2017) (observing but not passing judgment on the plaintiff’s proposed methodology for 
estimating passed-on damages). The In re Asacol court stated: 
According to the EPPs [“End Payor Plaintiffs,” or the last purchasers in 
line], they are not calculating “injury or damages by relying on a top-
down vertical ‘pass-through’ economic analysis[.]” Rather, “EPPs will use 
a ‘yardstick’ damages and impact methodology to examine the retail 
price of the drugs EPPs were forced to purchase” in comparison “to the 
forecasted price (and volume) of the drug that should have been available 
but-for Defendants’ misconduct[.]”[].  
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B. Who Is Injured, and How? 
Third, if we were going to give the overcharge to a single set of 
buyers it should be the end users, not the direct purchasers. The end 
user is the only person in the distribution chain who is unable to pass 
anything on.49 The impact varies from one situation to another, but in 
many cases the largest losses are those absorbed by end users, and often 
they absorb the entire overcharge. Many intermediaries use markup for-
mulas that are standardized across products. Consider the dairy example. 
Suppose that the milk retailer is Kroger, which routinely computes a 10% 
markup on its dairy products, depending on the extent of competition 
each item faces. If it pays $2.50 at wholesale in a competitive market it 
adds 10%, or 25¢. However, if it pays $3.50 it also adds 10%, which is now 
35¢. Far from “absorbing” part of the overcharge, Kroger actually exacts 
a higher markup when the price of milk is fixed, reflecting its standard-
ized percentage of the higher cartel price. The consumer gets hit even 
harder. However, the Supreme Court has applied the indirect purchaser 
rule even to situations, such as price regulated industries, where it is clear 
that pass-through is 100%.50 
This is not to say that Kroger in the above example is not injured by 
the price fixing. Its injury results from lost volume rather than the over-
charge. Under collusion, sales volume goes down.51 This suggests an 
important principle: The real injury to direct purchasers and other 
intermediaries in the distribution chain is not from the overcharge at all; 
rather, it is from the loss of sales volume. As a result, the “overcharge” is 
not even the theoretically correct measure of damages for an intermedi-
ary who passes on at least part of an overcharge. 
If we really wanted to award damages based on injury to a buyer’s 
business or property, as the statute requires, we would compute damages 
as lost profits for all intermediaries, including the direct purchaser. Only 
the final purchaser, or consumer, should obtain damages for the amount 
of the overcharge passed on to it. Lost profit damages do not present 
problems of computing pass-on. Rather, they require information about 
the impact of the unlawful practice on both the volume of sales and the 
reseller’s margin. In response to a cartel, volume virtually always goes 
down. Margins can go down, up, or stay the same depending on the 
                                                                                                                           
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). On the use of “comparator” methods 
rather than estimating passed-on damages, see Ewa Mendys-Komphorst, Assessing 
Damages in Antitrust Actions, Global Arbitration Rev. (Nov. 29, 2018), https:// 
globalarbitrationreview.com/print_article/gar/chapter/1177446/assessing-damages-in-
antitrust-actions?print=true [https://perma.cc/284J-JNQ7]. 
 49. See 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, supra note 2, ¶¶ 346a–c, k. 
 50. E.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990); see supra text 
accompanying notes 13–18. 
 51. See Peter Asch & J. J. Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable?, 58 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 1, 4–5 
(1976) (finding that the presence of collusive behavior is negatively associated with firm 
profitability, on which the demand for the firm’s products exerts an important effect). 
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reseller’s markup practices or the intensity of competition that it faces.52 
The before-and-after and “yardstick” methodologies commonly used in 
cases involving business damages work here as well.53 
To be sure, in common with all commercial damages formulas, lost 
profit formulations impose some complexities, but these are not differ-
ent in substance from those experienced by the victims of antitrust viola-
tions that exclude rivals, where overcharge measures are not relevant.54 
Indeed, a wide variety of commercial legal violations that are subject to 
private enforcement compute damages as lost profits.55 
Computing the lost profits that result from a cartel’s higher prices 
need not be any more complex than computing the lost profits resulting 
from, say, patent infringement or the breach of a supply contract. For 
example, the Patent Act permits recovery of lost profits attributable to an 
infringement,56 which requires the fact finder to determine the harm 
caused by each infringing sale of something that could range from a full 
substitute for the plaintiff’s product57 to a relatively small component.58 If 
the patent is for an improvement, the fact finder must disaggregate that 
portion of the loss of sales attributable to the improvement from that 
                                                                                                                           
 52. See Jorge Padilla, Economist’s Note: Should Profit Margins Play a More Decisive 
Role in Horizontal Merger Control?, 9 J. Eur. Competition L. & Prac. 260, 261–62 
(describing the relationship between profit margins and competition). 
 53. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1946) (using 
the two damage methods in conjunction); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 
(5th Cir. 1974) (explaining methods of proving lost profits). 
 54. On lost profit damages for exclusionary practices, see 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust 
Law, supra note 2, ¶ 397. 
 55. E.g., Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019) 
(approving a lost-profit measure in a breach of trademark case); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley 
Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same in a patent infringement case); Biotronik A.G. v. 
Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd., 11 N.E.3d 676 (N.Y. 2014) (same in a breach of contract 
case); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41 
(Tex. 1998) (same in a tort and breach of contract case). 
 56. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 57. See, e.g., WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2135, 2139 
(2018) (applying a patent damages provision to foreign sales of an infringer’s product that 
was substantially identical to patentee’s product). 
 58. See, for example, Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, concluding that the infringe-
ment damages should equal: 
[T]he difference between his pecuniary condition after the 
infringement, and what his condition would have been if the 
infringement had not occurred, is to be measured, so far as his own sales 
of locks are concerned, by the difference between the money he would 
have realized from such sales if the infringement had not interfered with 
such monopoly, and the money he did realize from such sales. If such 
difference can be ascertained by proper and satisfactory evidence, it is a 
proper measure of damages. 
117 U.S. 536, 552–53 (1886). 
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portion attributable to noninfringing conduct.59 There is no reason for 
thinking that computation of lost-profit damages from collusion would 
be more difficult than this. 
While pass-on must be allocated individually for each successive link 
in the distribution chain, loss of output is often simpler because the same 
loss passes from one entity to the next. For example, if a cartel of wheat 
growers reduces output by 30%, wholesale bakers will bake 30% less 
bread and retailers will sell 30% fewer loaves. Of course, complexities in 
the distribution chain, including the ability of intermediaries to vary the 
proportions of their inputs, can complicate these numbers. 
Guidelines from the European Commission to the national courts of 
member states permit purchaser damages to be computed by all of the 
methodologies discussed here.60 Injuries for what the Guidelines describe 
as “price effects,” or overcharge, can be estimated using the conventional 
pass-on methodologies contemplated in the Illinois Brick decision, or else 
by comparing overcharges in the violation market with those in markets 
that are not affected.61 The Guidelines also permit damages to be based 
                                                                                                                           
 59. As the Court in Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884), stated: 
When a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely new 
machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what particulars his 
improvement has added to the usefulness of the machine or 
contrivance. He must separate its results distinctly from those of the 
other parts, so that the benefits derived from it may be distinctly seen 
and appreciated. 
Id. at 121. 
 60. Guidelines for National Courts on How to Estimate the Share of Overcharge 
Which Was Passed on to the Indirect Purchaser, 2019 O.J. (C 267) 4, 24 [hereinafter 
Guidelines for National Courts] (“When estimating the passing-on related price effect 
national courts may rely on different types of economic approaches to 
quantification . . . .”). 
 61. Id. at 24–25. The Guidelines describe these as “comparator-based” methods, 
giving as examples: 
[1] price or margin data concerning this market before and/or after the 
infringement, usually referred to as the before-during-after approach; 
[2] data concerning the same (product) market but in a different 
geographical area, or another product market that is considered to 
evolve in a similar manner to the market where the direct or indirect 
purchaser operates, usually referred to as the cross-sectional approach; 
or 
[3] a combination of comparisons over time and comparisons across 
markets, usually referred to as the difference-in-differences approach. 
Id. at 25; see also Miguel de la Mano & Christopher Milde, Estimating the Pass-on Effect in 
Antitrust Damage Cases: Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of the “Comparator” Method 
vs. the “Pass-on Rate” Method (Apr. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=3380657 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a more com-
prehensive look at the problem in a wide variety of European actions, not limited to 
competition law, see generally Magnus Strand, The Passing-on Problem in Damages and 
Restitution Under EU Law (2017). 
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on what they call the “volume effect,” or lost profits from loss of sales.62 
Just like § 4 of the Clayton Act, the EU Damages Directive authorizes 
national courts to award provable damages for injuries sustained, but 
does not specify a particular methodology.63 However, the EU takes the 
more realistic approach, and one that is more faithful to the relevant 
provisions, of permitting damages to be estimated by any controllable 
method for which there is adequate evidentiary support. 
C.  Addressing Indirect Purchaser Harm: Expert Testimony 
The Illinois Brick decision is apparently based on the premise that 
damages measurement in antitrust cases is exceptional and requires 
special and more categorical treatment than is used for other types of 
commercial injuries. That is hardly obvious. One possible distinction is 
the existence of treble damages, but Congress can always change that. As 
noted above, other types of injuries such as those that result from patent 
infringement pose complexities that are as great or greater.64 
Rather than being so categorical about the nature of damages, we 
should assess how damages operate in a particular case, and the varia-
tions can be substantial. This means that judges must assess the reliability 
and applicability of expert testimony. Once a judge has made that assess-
ment and admitted the testimony, the testimony still must be subjected to 
rigorous cross-examination at trial. 
The Supreme Court’s Daubert decision,65 which came fifteen years 
after Illinois Brick, should be the controlling mechanism for evaluating 
expert models rather than anything as blunt, categorical, and frankly 
wrong as the indirect purchaser rule.66 Daubert rulings, which are gener-
ally not subject to jury control, should provide judges with an adequate 
mechanism for ensuring that expert damages reports are based on relia-
ble and relevant assumptions, methodologies, and data.67 In a particular 
                                                                                                                           
 62. Guidelines for National Courts, supra note 60, at 13. 
 63. Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
November 2014 on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for 
Infringement of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, 2014 O.J. (L 349) 1, 8–9 (stating that each member state has the 
responsibility to determine its own rules for qualifying the harm, such as the required 
proof and methods). 
 64. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 65. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 66. On the use of Daubert in antitrust damages models see 2A Areeda et al., Antitrust 
Law, supra note 2, ¶¶ 340a, 399. 
 67. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 39 (2013) (Ginsburg & Breyer, 
JJ., dissenting) (assuming that Daubert applies to expert evidence in antitrust case); ZF 
Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying Daubert to 
damages evidence of lost profits in an antitrust case); City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros 
Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 563–67 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying Daubert to evidence of an 
overcharge from collusion). 
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case, if there is doubt about a particular expert opinion, the court will be re-
quired to make a Daubert ruling with respect to the expert’s methodology.68 
IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE, OR THE PROPER MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGES? 
The Apple dissenters adopted a distinctively noneconomic approach 
that dispensed with the pass-on problem entirely. Indeed, they were not 
even concerned about who was injured. They reasoned that only the 
direct purchaser had an injury that was “proximately caused” by the 
defendant’s antitrust violation.69 This view harkens back to a nineteenth-
century tort law concept that was used by some courts to limit tort 
liability, particularly in railroad cases.70 Under this rule, only a single 
entity could be said to have an injury that was proximately caused by the 
defendant’s conduct. That approach was rejected by John Stuart Mill by 
the mid-nineteenth century.71 The dissent’s approach also detaches 
proximate cause concerns from the factor that has always been central to 
proximate cause inquiries—foreseeability.72 Indeed, it is so foreseeable 
that overcharge injuries will be passed on that no one seriously disputes 
it.73 
In the legal system, this narrow approach to proximate cause analysis 
was properly abandoned in tort cases and should be laid to rest. In eco-
nomics, it was very largely upended by the marginalist revolution, which 
                                                                                                                           
 68. See, e.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811–13 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
 69. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1530–31 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 70. See, e.g., Blythe v. Denver & R.G. Ry. Co., 25 P. 702, 702–04 (Colo. 1891) (holding 
that an “act of God” did not meet the requirement of proximate cause); Stone v. Bos. & 
A.R. Co., 51 N.E. 1, 2–4 (Mass. 1898) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover when oil 
leaking from barrels on a railroad platform was ignited by a person unconnected to the 
railroad for a lack of proximate cause); see also Hovenkamp, The Opening of American 
Law, supra note 36, 106–22. 
 71. See 1 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a 
Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and Methods of Scientific Investigation 
241, 398 (1843) (“For every event, there exists some combination of objects or events, 
some given concurrence of circumstances, positive and negative, the occurrence of which 
will always be followed by that phenomenon.”). A sharp debate ensued in the United 
States between Mill and Francis Wharton, an orthodox cleric who wrote on legal subjects 
and adhered to strictly premarginalist views. See Francis Wharton, The Liability of Railway 
Companies for Remote Fires: Proximate and Remote Cause 731–47 (1876); Francis 
Wharton, A Suggestion as to Causation 5–14 (1874). 
 72. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 95 (1881) (“There is no 
such power [to avoid evil] where the evil cannot be foreseen.”); see also Mark F. Grady, 
Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 293, 322–33 (2002); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1247, 1252–
54 (2009). 
 73. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305–06 (2017) (finding 
that proximate cause limited liability for a Fair Housing Act violation, even for certain 
foreseeable harms). 
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first provided serious tools to investigate how economic disruptions are 
passed through the economy.74 It makes even less sense in antitrust cases. 
The Apple dissent’s view also confuses questions about proximate 
cause, or legal cause, with questions about the proper way to measure 
damages.75 Illinois Brick was distinctly not a case about causation or proxi-
mate cause. Indeed, the majority never used the term at all, and Justice 
Brennan used it only a single time in his dissent.76 The virtually exclusive 
concern with Illinois Brick was with computation of damages in situations 
where an overcharge might be passed on from one party to another. 
Even on its own terms it seems hard to justify a conclusion that only 
the direct purchaser has an injury “proximately caused” by the violation 
when in many cases it suffered no overcharge injury at all. 
CONCLUSION 
Working within the context of the existing Illinois Brick rule, the 
majority reached the right conclusion about its application in Apple v. 
Pepper. While that eliminates some of the irrationalities of the indirect 
purchaser rule as it has been applied, it is hardly a solution to the 
problem. The correct solution is more consistent with the statutory lan-
guage granting an action to (1) “any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property,” and then measuring the recovery as the (2) 
“damages by him sustained.”77 In the process, this solution addresses a 
serious and widely recognized problem—namely, that the current policy 
toward price fixing under-deters.78 
                                                                                                                           
 74. See Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law, supra note 36, 123–55. 
 75. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1528–31 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 76. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
 78. See, e.g., OECD, Cartel Sanctions Against Individuals 17 (2003), 
https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/34306028.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9D-
YWM9] (“It is commonly assumed, however, that corporate fines rarely reach a level that 
would maximize their deterrent effect.”); Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price 
Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 531, 535 (1991) (finding 
that the probability of a particular conspiracy being caught is between 13% to 17% in a 
given year); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: 
Crime Pays, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 427, 435–42 (2012) (describing the debate generally 
between optimal “law and economics” deterrence approaches targeting corporations and 
individual sanctions); John M. Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic 
Evidence, 22 Res. L. & Econ. 59, 107 (2007) (“Despite the evident increases in cartel 
detection rates and the size of monetary fines and penalties in the past decade, a good 
case can be made that current global anticartel regimes are under-deterring.”); Joseph E. 
Harrington, Jr. & Yanhao Wei, What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us About 
the Duration of All Cartels?, 127 Econ. J. 1977, 1977–79, 2003 (2017) (describing generally 
the theoretical issues with estimating the duration of cartels from observed behavior of 
discovered cartels and effects on claims about deterrence); Louis Kaplow, An Economic 
Approach to Price Fixing, 77 Antitrust L.J. 343, 446 (2011) (“Because of difficulties with 
detection, achieving effective deterrence is not easy, and empirical evidence suggests that 
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End-user purchasers who are not in a position to pass on anything 
should be awarded overcharge damages for the full overcharge they paid, 
for that measures the injury that they have sustained. All intermediaries 
beginning with the direct purchaser should be awarded damages for lost 
profits, which represents injuries from both absorbed overcharges and 
the loss of sales that always accompany collusion. None of these recover-
ies is “duplicative,” and none requires complex apportioning of passed 
on damages. More importantly, this methodology is driven by the facts of 
each case and brings antitrust damages measurement more in line with 
damages formulation across the full range of commercial harms. 
                                                                                                                           
deterrence is inadequate even in the United States, which is regarded to have the toughest 
enforcement in terms of both overall (public and private) effort and the level of 
sanctions.”); Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the 
Crime, 5 Eur. Comp. J. 19, 29–33, 36 (2009) (arguing that deterrence requires individual 
sanctions, and more than monetary sanctions); see also Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust 
Policy, supra note 5, §§ 4.1–.7, 17.1–.7. 
